Legal Studies Paper No. 2009-17
98 California L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2010)

“Election Administration Reform
and the New Institutionalism”

Professor Richard L. Hasen

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392299
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392299

Preliminary Draft: April 2009. Please do not cite or quote without permission
Forthcoming, 98 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ___ (2010)

BOOK REVIEW
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM
AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO
FIX IT
By Heather K. Gerken†
Princeton University Press 2009. Pp. 181. $24.95 cloth.
Richard L. Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
One of the hallmarks of a mature democracy is professionalized,
centralized, and nonpartisan election administration. It is hardly news that the
United States does not fit this model, and that since the 2000 election meltdown
culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,1 the country has
faced biannual anxiety over whether the next meltdown is imminent.2 The
question election law scholars and others have been grappling with is how to fix
an obviously broken system, now almost a decade after the Florida debacle.
Some election law scholars at first hoped the courts would spur election
administration reform through a generous reading of Bush v. Gore’s equal
protection holding.3 Much like the Supreme Court solved the problem of grossly
malapportioned districts through the creation of the “one person, one vote”
doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause,4 Bush v. Gore could “create a more
†
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1
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2
Richard L. Hasen, Keeping the Voting Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006 (referring to “biannual
anxiety over whether we are headed for another election meltdown.”).
3
Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle
for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Op-Ed, The
Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A39; Cass R. Sunstein, The Equal
Chance to Have One’s Vote Count, 21 L. & PHIL. 121, 133 (2002).
4
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, &
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 3 (4th ed. 2008); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 3 (3d ed. 2007).
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robust constitutional examination of voting practices.”5 Despite some initial
movement in this direction, courts so far have not been the vehicle driving change
in our system of election administration,6 even though the amount of electionrelated litigation has more than doubled since 2000.7
Nor has Congress done much to take the lead. The one piece of election
reform legislation passed since 2000, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),8 has
not been viewed as a success. Helpfully, HAVA provided money to replace the
worst-performing voting machines. But it also included a host of vague
requirements that have caused an increase in litigation around the time of
elections, and it mandated the creation of an agency, the United States Election
Assistance Commission (EAC) that appears designed to fail.9
Faced with little action by the courts or Congress, some election law
scholars have turned to institutional design, considering new institutions or
mechanisms, such as amicus courts10 and electoral advisory commissions,11 to
prod existing institutions into election reform. Heather Gerken’s significant new
book, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System is Failing and How To
Fix It,12 represents the most sustained effort in this New Institutionalist vein. The
well-written and enjoyable book makes the case for the creation of a ranking of
states (“the Democracy Index”) along a number of election administration
criteria, such as how well the system counts votes and how long it takes voters to
cast a ballot. Gerken argues that the ranking system will create the right
incentives for jurisdictions to move toward professionalized and non-partisan
election administration.
Gerken’s proposal, if enacted in the right way, is a worthy one that could
well lead to the creation of greater professionalism in the election administration
field. The public pronouncement of rubrics to measure election administration
performance could spur the emergence of “best practices,” and publicity
surrounding the index and the potential for embarrassment could generate
5

Issacharoff, supra note 3.
Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2007).
7
Marcia Coyle, Election Litigation Has Doubled Since 2000, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428407304.
8
Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 15301–15545 (West 2007).
9
For an account of controversy at the EAC, see Hasen, supra note 6, at 20-21.
10
Edward B. Foley, Setting an Example of Non-Partisan Judging: An “Amicus Court” for
Election Cases, Election Law & Moritz, Free & Fair Blog, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/freefair/articles.php?ID=409.
11
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Electoral Commissions and Electoral Reform, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425
(2006); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1395–1404 (2005).
12
GERKEN, supra note †.
6
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competition among jurisdictions. Increased professionalization of American
election administration would be a notable achievement, because a great deal of
the potential for election meltdown stems from lack of resources and training.
Gerken is surely right that the Index is better (I would say much better)
than nothing;13 but it is no panacea. A congressionally-mandated (or foundationfunded) Index likely will have insufficient strength to overcome the pathologies
of partisanship and localism, both of which pervade American election
administration. The war over voter identification and accusations of fraud in the
2008 election, as well as the partisan sniping in the Minnesota U.S. Senate
recount and contest, provide ample proof of the difficulties ahead. Even Gerken’s
criteria for creating the Index will be viewed by some Republicans as having a
conscious or subconscious pro-Democratic Party bias. Meaningful election reform
may well come only when imposed from the top by a unified party government,
or imposed on the state level through the initiative process, rather than cajoled
from the bottom through shaming mechanisms and potential inter-jurisdictional
competition.
Part I of this review sets forth Gerken’s proposal for a Democracy Index.
Part II situates the book within the New Institutionalist approach to election
administration reform. It argues that Gerken’s work is significant not only for its
specific proposal but also because it advances the New Institutionalism. It
catalogs the various ways in which the addition of information may spark both
rational and emotional reactions by election administrators, legislators, judges, the
public, and political parties.
Part III turns from the theory of causal mechanisms of the New
Institutionalism to a look at the available evidence. Based upon what we know, it
appears that the Democracy Index could well increase the professionalism of
election administration in the United States, and thereby decrease the risk of
electoral meltdown. But the Index likely will not be enough to overcome the twin
pathologies of partisanship and localism that have thus far blocked
comprehensive election administration reform. This Review concludes by noting
that Old Institutionalism—hardball politics backed by one party or the use in
states of an initiative bypass—rather than the soft politics of the New
Institutionalism, may present the best hope to fully revamp our system of election
administration.

13

Id. at 137 (“Even if you don’t buy everything I’ve said, it’s worth asking yourself this question:
As opposed to what? Is there a better reform proposal on the horizon?”).
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I.
WHY A DEMOCRACY INDEX?
Heather Gerken is known for her sophisticated and nuanced writing,
primarily in the fields of election law and constitutional law. But she is not a
typical law school law professor ensconced in her ivory tower. Though even the
titles of her law review articles sometimes having me running for my dictionary,14
The Democracy Index is written informally and casually for the general reader.
To keep the general reader’s attention, the book engages in a fair bit of
storytelling and makes a valiant attempt at humor: I never expected to see
references to the sport of “extreme ironing”15 much less to chia pets and tongue
rings,16 in a work discussing residual vote rates. Gerken is also committed to
having her ideas translated into action. In the last congressional term, she worked
with then- Senators Obama and Clinton to have her ideas embodied in
legislation,17 and has teamed with think tanks and foundations interested in
election administration reform18 to advance the arguments in the book.
The book begins by detailing the problems in U.S. election administration
since 2000, a recitation that will be familiar to those in the field19 but probably
shocking to a more general reader. She describes the 18,000 undervotes in a 2006
Florida congressional race,20 which likely resulted from poor ballot design used
on electronic voting machines in Sarasota County;21 absurdly long lines in places
like Colorado;22 server crashes leading to lost votes in North Carolina and Ohio;23
and a host of other problems. She concludes that “[t]he best evidence we have
suggests that our election system is clunky at best and dysfunctional at worst.”24

14

See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Supreme Court, Election Law,
and Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
15
Gerken, supra note †, at 69.
16
Id. at 87. In the interest of potential bias, I have neither a chia pet nor a tongue ring, and would
have a difficult time choosing between the two of them.
17
See infra Part III.
18
Gerken, supra note †, at 130 (noting 2007 conference on Democracy Index “sponsored by the
Pew Center on the States, the Joyce Foundation, the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project and
the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law”).
19
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 6; Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S.
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958 (2005).
20
Gerken, supra note †, at 2.
21
Laurin Frisina et al., Ballot Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006
Midterm Elections in Florida, 7 ELECTION L.J. 25 (2008).
22
Gerken, supra note †, at 2.
23
Id. at 2-3.
24
Id. at 1.
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Gerken lingers on the words “the best evidence we have”25 for good
reason. When it comes to election administration, the data situation is dire. As
Professor Nate Persily recently testified to the Senate Rules Committee, “We do
not really know how many voters are registered or even how many, in fact, voted
in 2008.”26 That should give a sense of the scope of the problem.
Chapter 1 of Gerken’s book previews her argument. She details her best
guess as to why there are problems in running U.S. elections and puts forward her
proposed Democracy Index as a solution.27 She begins with a problem she refers
to as “deferred maintenance,”28 under which she includes broken down voting
machines, poor registration systems, inadequate poll worker training and
compensation.29 Like others,30 she focuses much of her attention on inadequate
voter registration systems.31

25

See id. at 1 n.*.
Testimony of Professor Nathaniel Persily, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law and
Political Science, Columbia Law School, Before the United States Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration on “Voter Registration: Assessing Current Problems,” Mar. 9, 2009, available
at:
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=CommitteeSchedule.Testimony&Hearing_I
D=c33b5ae8-aee8-413e-85db-a256ce6169f6&Witness_ID=b032a6f0-d385-4d54-96801ed7d6522018. See also Gerken, supra note †, at 43 (“We do not know how many people cast a
ballot during our last presidential election because 20 percent of the states do not report this
information; they disclose only how many ballots were successfully counted.”).
27
Gerken notes some earlier election law scholarship noting the importance of data in overcoming
the difficulties of adopting election reform measures, see id. at 144 n.18. The earliest notation
appears to be Dan Tokaji, The Moneyball Approach to Election Reform, Election Law@Moritz
Weekly
Comment,
Oct.
18,
2005,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/051018.php.
28
I do not think that the label “deferred maintenance” is accurate. Gerken uses the analogy of the
2007 collapse of a bridge in Minnesota, which she said was due to failure to take care of aging
physical infrastructure. Gerken, supra note †, at 2. But the analogy does not hold up.
Presumably the Minnesota bridge originally was well-designed and built to carry its load, and
over time its strength deteriorated because of the failure to take steps to forestall deterioration. In
contrast, I would argue that in many jurisdictions our election administration system was never
properly designed or implemented, and that the problem is less a failure to maintain than a failure
to build a system correctly in the first place.
29
Gerken, supra note †, at 12-13
30
Persily, supra note 26; Testimony of Steven Ansolabehere, Professor, Harvard School of
Government, Before the United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on “Voter
Registration:
Assessing
Current
Problems,”
Mar.
9,
2009,
available
at:
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=CommitteeSchedule.Testimony&Hearing_I
D=c33b5ae8-aee8-413e-85db-a256ce6169f6&Witness_ID=e394ba39-8bf4-441c-8ed36e8c68cf4b23 (“According to data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 4 to 5
million people report administrative procedures as the reason for not registering, and
approximately 4 million of registered voters did not vote because of administrative problems,
26
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She then lays blame for these problems with the twin forces of
partisanship and localism.32 As to partisanship, she notes that the United States is
an outlier among election systems in relying upon “election officials [who]
depend on their party for their jobs.”33 Using former Ohio Secretary of State
Kenneth Blackwell as her poster child, Gerken details how Blackwell was Ohio
chair of the George W. Bush reelection campaign in Ohio and that he made a host
of election administration decisions (such as the requirement that voter
registration cards be submitted on eighty-point weight card stock) that were
roundly criticized as motivated by partisan considerations.34
Gerken also considers lack of professionalism among election
administrators as a by-product of partisanship. Whether or not partisanship is the
cause for lack of professionalism,35 the lack of professionalism is certainly a
problem. As Gerken details, there are no general sets of best practices, few
learning opportunities for election officials, inadequate pay, and a host of other
problems. She cites a national survey of local election officials revealing “that the
average election official doesn’t possess a college degree and earns less than
$50,000 per year, with some local officials earning as little as $10,000 per year.
The average local official oversees a wide range of responsibilities beyond
running elections but has received fewer than twenty hours of training.”36
Compounding the problem of lack of professionalism is “invisibility.”
People do not focus on election administration until there are problems, usually
when it is too late to do anything about them.37 The institutional press, too, stops

approximately the same magnitude as we saw in 2000.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and
Election Reform, 17 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 453 (2008).
31
Gerken, supra note †, at 14-15; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election
Administration, 6 ELECTION L.J. 118, 121 (2007) (characterizing “decentralization and
partisanship” as the “two dominant characteristics of American election administration,” and
citing as support Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 82 (2004)).
32
Gerken, supra note †, at 15.
33
Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
34
Id. at 17-18.
35
Gerken states that “[a] system that depends on the political parties to staff it is unlikely to be
staffed with trained experts.” Id. at 18. She offers no evidence that political parties tend to fill
rank-and-file positions in election administration; my impression those positions typically are civil
service positions with only the top staff chosen through political appointment.
36
Id. at 22 (citing Eric A. Fischer and Kevin J. Coleman, Election Reform and Local Election
Officials: Results of Two National Surveys, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
RL034363, Feb. 7, 2008). In an effort to keep things light Gerken reminds us a few times
throughout the book that Fischer also is an expert on the sex life of hermaphroditic sharks.
GERKEN, supra.
37
Id. at 23-24.
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paying attention to problems as soon as the election ends without meltdown.38
Add to that concerns about partisan ramifications of election administration
reforms, and it is difficult to get enough money to fund election reform efforts.
Gerken’s proposed solution to these problems (what she refers to as a
“here-to-there” strategy39) is the creation of a Democracy Index. The book itself
does not offer a Democracy Index;40 instead, it makes an argument for such an
Index and, as a first step, for the collection of the kind of data that would be
necessary for the Index’s construction.
The Index must appeal to “a wide range of stakeholders—voters, experts,
election administrators policymakers, and reformers” focusing on the “nuts-andbolts issues (the basic mechanics of election administration).”41 Gerken would
therefore exclude a focus on issues beyond election administrators’ control.42 To
appeal to issues of concern to the average voter and what is fairly in the ambit of
an election administrator’s control, “the Index ought to focus on three simple
things: (1) registering voters, (2) casting ballots, and (3) counting votes.”43 More
specifically, Gerken writes that the Index
38

Id. at 141; see also Richard L. Hasen, Eight Years After Bush v. Gore, Why is There Still So
Much Election Litigation and What Does This Mean for Voter Confidence in the Electoral
WRIT,
Oct.
20,
2008,
Process?,
FINDLAW’S
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20081020_hasen.html.
39
Gerken, supra note †, at 26.
40
Do not be misled by the “U.S. News”-like cover of the book, which makes it appear as though
the book includes lists of the “#1 States to Vote” and of “over 300 municipalities” with “the
shortest lines” the “top states where your vote really counts,” the “easiest places to cast an
absentee ballot,” the “cities with the most accurate voter rolls, the “leading states for accurate
voting machines,” and the “best registration practices.” This hyperbole is no doubt the brainchild
of someone in the publisher’s marketing department rather than the fault of the author.
The book’s only actual election administration ranking is a ranking of states in terms of
how well they reported certain data to the EAC. See Gerken, supra note †, at 44-47. I saw no
ranking of “300 municipalities” in the book.
41
Id. at 26-27.
42
She offers the example of low turnout as one potentially beyond an election administrator’s
control. “Low turnout…is caused in part by socioeconomics and the absence of competitive
elections. Administrators in low-ranked states will not bother with a ranking that expects them to
remedy systemic problems associated with poverty or compensate for lack of excitement about a
race.” Id. at 27. Low turnout could be caused in part by election administrator failures, such as
the presence of long lines, or lack of faith that election administrators will count the votes of
people who show up. Turnout could still be a measure in the Index, so long as controls were
introduced to deal with issues such as socioeconomic status, as Gerken acknowledges on page
132. By focusing on turnout at the top of the ballot, lack of excitement about a race should not be
a serious concern. Gerken is surely right on the broader point: an index that measured “hot-button
topics like felon disenfranchisement or campaign finance,” id. at 27, would be ill-suited as a
measure of the competence of the system of election administration.
43
Id. at 28.
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should assess how close a jurisdiction comes to reaching these goals:
Every eligible voter who wants to register can do so.
Every registered voter who wants to cast a ballot can do so.
Every ballot cast is counted properly.44
Gerken argues that the three performance categories balance issues of
accuracy, convenience, and “integrity,” by which she means “preventing fraud.”45
As I detail in Part III, this is the most contestable point in the book; the list of
three performance categories, by not prominently including the standard that only
eligible voters are able to register and vote, places Gerken clearly in the “access”
over “integrity” camp, meaning that she has advocated for an Index favoring
values trumpeted by Democrats over those favored by Republicans.46

44

Id. at 29; see also id. at 123.
Id. at 29-30.
46
At one point later in the book, she refers to an administration’s “fraud score” as part of the
Index. See id. at 106. She also says that “we’d want to be sure that the voters being registered are
eligible.” Id. at 124. It is not clear how this fraud measure would be calculated. On the general
problems of measuring election fraud and even defining it, see Lorraine Minnite, Book Review,
Finding Election Fraud—Maybe, ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (reviewing ELECTION
FRAUD: DETECTING AND DETERRING ELECTORAL MANIPULATION (R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E.
Hall, & Susan D. Hyde, eds. 2008)).
Elsewhere in the book she argues that the Index’s architects “should use polling and
focus groups to be sure they are including metrics that appeal to most voters.” Id. at 122. If the
architects did so, they might focus more on questions of “integrity,” as support for voter
identification laws remains popular. See Rasmussen Reports, 80% Believe Voters Should Be
Required
to
Show
Photo
ID,
Jan
9,
2008,
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/
80_believe_voters_should_be_required_to_show_photo_id; but see Stephen Ansolabehere and
Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1740 (2008) (“We find
that voters who have been forced to show identification are no less likely to perceive fraud than
those not similarly subject to an ID requirement.”.) Another example is electronic voting. By
many accounts, electronic voting is one of the most accurate systems for recording votes. But
public distrust over the technology and the possibility of “hacked votes” remains a salient force
against its adoption, and indeed was responsible for its abandonment in some jurisdictions. See
Charles Stewart III, Assessment of Voting Systems (Book Review), 8 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming
2009) (reviewing R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2008)).
45
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Gerken concludes her discussion of the main goals of the Index by talking
in detail about design.47 The Index must be constructed using simple categories
with reasonably comprehensive and transparent metrics, such as the influential
CalTech-MIT measure of “residual vote rates,” which measures the difference
between the number of voters recorded as showing up at the polls and the number
of voters who cast a vote for president.48
The remainder of Gerken’s book argues why the Index is likely to
improve the state of U.S. election administration. “By presenting the right
information in the right form, a Democracy Index has the potential to harness
partisanship and local competition in the service of reform.”49 She compares
election law scholar Spencer Overton with environmental law scholar Dan Esty.
Overton was a member of the Carter-Baker Election Reform Commission, and he
issued a blistering dissent from the commission’s recommendation for the
adoption of photographic voter identification requirements at the polls.50 The
voter identification battle later went all the way to the Supreme Court, with the
Court upholding Indiana’s new voter identification law, the strictest such law in
the nation.51 As Gerken tells it, the reason that Overton’s side lost in the Supreme
Court is the lack of data: “The Supreme Court didn’t have much evidence to cite
for its view that in-person vote fraud was a problem. So it cited the Carter-Baker
Report, which in turn didn’t have much evidence to cite….It’s turtles all the way
down.”52
After bemoaning the lack of data in the election administration field,
Gerken looks at how the private sector, such as Wal-mart, mines data for
competitive advantage, and how the government uses data such as the Gross
Domestic Product for successful government planning.53 But Gerken focuses
most on the environmental rankings pioneered by Esty. Esty’s ranking success is
what Gerken hopes can be replicated through the Democracy Index.
Esty created the “Environmental Performance Index” (EPI), a ranking of
149 countries along twenty-five performance indicators related to the
47

Id. at 31-37.
See infra Part III (discussing residual vote rates).
49
Gerken, supra note †, at 26.
50
The dissenting statement is posted at http://www.carterbakerdissent.com/; see also Spencer
Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 621 (2007).
51
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
52
Id. at 41. There was little evidence presented in the case either that voter identification laws
would prevent fraud or boost confidence, or that such laws would burden many voters. Given the
paucity of evidence on both sides, Gerken doesn’t explain why the lack of data (as opposed to
other factors) led the court to side with the Carter-Baker suppositions rather than with others
making contrary arguments. It is hard to believe that the report itself did anything to change the
minds of the Justices on the Court.
53
Id. at 49-53.
48
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environment.54 Throughout the book, Gerken uses the successes of the EPI to
advocate for the Democracy Index. When Belgium fell below its peer countries
in the EPI rankings, it worked hard to pull its numbers up.55 When South Korea
ranked relatively low on the ranking, it “assembled a team of thirty people—at a
cost of roughly $5 million per year—to figure out how to do better.”56
Gerken attributes the EPI’s success to a number of factors. “It packages
environmental concerns in the language of business, providing policymakers and
voters hard data and comparative benchmarks to assess their nation’s
performance.”57 It “helps reformers and policymakers pinpoint problems and
identify where they can do better.”58 It allows for comparison between similarly
situated countries,59 and therefore it can spur competition between neighbors or
peer countries.60
Gerken then argues that a similar dynamic would occur with the creation
of a Democracy Index. The Index should give voters an easy-to-understand
handle on how well relative to other places a jurisdiction administers its
elections.61 Further, low rankings would give competing candidates for election
administration jobs (such as secretary of state) something to campaign over.62
She believes the Index will be immune to claims of political bias, assuming it is
issued by a neutral group, and not a group such as the ACLU or Cato Institute.63
But she acknowledges that the content of the Index matters in terms of public
acceptance as well: “If the ranking’s opponents can point to a set of metrics
reasonably identified with one side of the partisan divide, the Index may lose its
power.”64
Gerken also argues that a ranking will “shame local officials into doing
the right thing.”65 She points to improvement in the residual vote rate as an
example of such success.66 She expects that the Index would spur a race to the
top among states, or at least a race not to be at the bottom of a peer group of
Finally, Gerken believes that the rankings will give election
states.67
54

See id. at 54-57.
Id. at 55.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 56.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 57
60
Id.
61
Id. at 66-72.
62
Id. at 72-74.
63
Id. at 75.
64
Id. at 75 n.*.
65
Id. at 75.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 76-77.
55
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administrators the ammunition they need to go to elected officials to demand
greater resources for machinery, training and salaries.68
Chapter 4 of the book goes deeper into the weeds to deal with common
problems that can arise with the issuance of rankings, issues which will be very
familiar to law professors familiar with the U.S. News law school rankings:
cheating, overvaluation of the meaning of rankings, and unintended
consequences.69 Here Gerken responds as best as she can to potential problems
given that there is no actual Democracy Index yet, and therefore no experience to
know whether or not the ranking would work as intended.70
Gerken concludes her book with a chapter (and an Afterword, written right
after the election of President Obama, for whom Gerken served as a member of
his election law team) on how to get the Democracy Index put into practice.
Here, Gerken recounts how she published her initial idea for an index in Legal
Times, how the idea was quickly embodied in legislation introduced by thenSenators Obama and Clinton, and how the Pew Center on the States’ “Making
Voting Work” project and other foundations supported this effort.
Gerken argues for federal legislation and federal funding to support the
data collection effort and the creation of the Index.71 Barring that, she argues that
the funding should come from private foundations, perhaps with support from the
EAC.72 She outlines a host of strategies to get jurisdictions to produce data, and
to verify those data with outside sources.

68

Id. at 82-91.
Id. at 93-109.
70
Gerken argues that the ranking would shift the burden of proof to election administrators with
low rankings to prove that the rankings are undeserved. The burden of proof point is a good one,
but Gerken misuses an example from tort law to make the point. She uses an example involving
three companies, each of whom has dumped chemicals into a river but only one of the company’s
chemicals has harmed a victim. She says that the victim can use “joint and several liability” to
shift the burden of proof. Id. at 102-03. In fact, tort law is more complicated. The burden of
proof shifts not through the doctrine of “joint and several liability” (which holds that when a court
finds more than one person liable for a tort, a plaintiff can recover from any or all of the
tortfeasors until the plaintiff has had full satisfaction of judgment), but under a special causation
rule referred to as “alternative liability.” Under this doctrine, made most famous by the California
Supreme Court opinion of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) the tort plaintiff can prove that
all the defendants in court committed tortious conduct, and that one of the defendants in the court
had to be the actual cause of plaintiff’s injury, the burden shifts to each defendant to prove that he
or she was not the actual cause of plaintiff’s injury. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE GLANNON
GUIDE TO TORTS 228-30 (2009). But I suppose alternative liability is only slightly more germane
to the topic of election administration reform than chia pets and tongue rings.
71
Gerken, supra note †, at 118-20.
72
Id. at 120-21.
69
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In the end, Gerken concludes that the Democracy Index will be successful
because it does not directly “impose standards” on election jurisdictions.73 Rather
it uses “shaming of an unusual sort” that “does not turn on some ideal standard,
but holds poor performers up to a realistic baseline, challenging them to do as
well as their neighbors.”74
II.
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: INFORMATION, SHAME, AND MONEY
In contrast to earlier juricentric models of election law that are premised
upon courts correcting political market failures, the new institutionalist approach
expects less of courts and more of other mechanisms or institutions to stimulate
change. Gerken’s Democracy Index offers the richest account so far of these new
institutions and mechanisms, so it is worth exploring them in some detail.
As noted in Part I, Gerken offers a number of reasons why she expects the
Democracy Index to improve election administration. Some of the causal
mechanisms for change that Gerken posits depend upon state and local election
administrators acting rationally upon receiving additional information and facing
outside pressures from legislatures, courts, the public or political parties; other
mechanisms depend upon the administrators’ emotional reactions to the rankings.
Figure 1 is my interpretation of how Gerken posits that the provision of new
information about election administration performance through the Democracy
Index could lead to improved outputs.
Under the model, new information from the Index has both a direct and
indirect effect on state and local election administrators. Directly, the index may
trigger both rational and emotional responses in the administrators to the new
information. Indirectly, the new information may trigger rational and emotional
responses in other people and entities who hold influence over election
administrators. Thus, legislators, the public, courts, and political parties react to
the information contained in the Index and then may pressure or encourage
election administrators to act in certain ways.

73
74

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
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Rationally improve process in light of new info.
Rationally respond to outside pressures
threatening job security or offering incentives

Emotional reactions:
•
•

Shame/pride
Inter-jurisdictional competitiveness

•

Emotional fear of losing job

Improved election administration
•
•
•

Fair
Non-partisan
Competent and professional

Figure 1. State and Local Election Administrators’
Potential Response New Information Generated by the Democracy Index

Election administrators (as well as outsiders, such as legislators and the
public) react rationally to information provided by the Index to improve election
administration. Jurisdictions learn of their strengths and deficiencies relative to
other jurisdictions, and explore the reasons for relatively low rankings. Some
problems will require additional funds, which are easier to justify (and demand)
in the presence of comparative data. Other problems will require revamping of
machinery, or organizational management, chains of command or public
relations. Election administrators also rationally respond to threats to job security
and incentives for better performance from legislators, the public, and others.
Election administrators also respond emotionally to the rankings. They
may feel shame in not being highly ranked, or not ranked highly against a relevant
peer group. They may feel pride at being ranked highly, and determined to keep a
high ranking. Similarly, the rankings may engender inter-jurisdictional
competitiveness, just as the U.S. News rankings trigger competitive behavior
among competing law schools. Finally, election administrators may react
emotionally out of fear of losing their jobs because of disapproval of legislators,
the public, and others, or, to the extent that the administrators are elected, to
competitors who run against them in future elections.
Of course, legislators, the public, and others may react rationally and
emotionally to the rankings as well. Legislators in their oversight function may
demand competent election administration, and the public may do so as well. The
same forces of shame, pride, and inter-jurisdictional competition that drive
election administrators may drive the public, legislators, and others into
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pressuring election administrators to improve performance. Judges too may be
influenced by the rankings, deferring more to the decision of an election
administrator deemed relatively competent by a neutral ranking than to an
administrator with a low ranking.
In the next Part I consider whether the idealized assumptions of the
Gerken causal mechanism are likely to match reality. Here, I note the affinity of
the Democracy Index with other New Institutionalist approaches to election
reform. Consider, for example, Ned Foley’s “amicus court” proposal.75 Foley
would convene an amicus court comprised of equal numbers of Democratic
judges, Republican judges, and Independents to consider high-profile election
cases being considered before real courts. The amicus court would submit its
proposed decision in the form of an amicus brief to the actual court.
According to Foley, the amicus court could indirectly influence courts to
decide cases without regard to partisanship:
Unanimity among the amicus judges would show how to resolve
the case without partisanship. But even a divided ruling from the Amicus
Court, given its independent tiebreaker, would cast a salutary shadow over
the actual court’s deliberations. If the actual result differed from the
Amicus Court’s, the divergence would be questioned. To avoid such
scrutiny, the actual judges might follow the Amicus Court’s outcome and
reasoning. In this way, without government power, the Amicus Court
could promote fairness — and the perception of fairness — in resolving
election disputes.
Over time, if the Amicus Court develops a strong reputation for
nonpartisan fairness, candidates might feel compelled to accept its
judgment, pledging not to seek a contrary ruling from an actual court. The
Amicus Court then would become a kind of alternative arbitration panel
for election litigation, much like labor arbitration developed to settle
union-management disputes. This scenario is most likely to occur if the
Amicus Court’s members, in addition to having blue-ribbon resumés,
display judicious temperament in striving for consensus rulings grounded
in the objective requirements of law.76
The underpinnings of Foley’s arguments are quite similar to Gerken’s.
The amicus court provides information about “the objective requirements of law.”
The judges rationally may use this information as an aid to decision.
75
76

Foley, supra note 10.
Id.
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Emotionally, judges may also feel shame if they deviate from the neutral amicus
court’s requirements and feel pride if they follow the amicus court. The public
gains a new tool to evaluate the fairness of judges, an objective baseline, much
like how the Index would allow the public and legislators to evaluate the
competence and fairness of election administrators.
Consider also Elmendorf’s discussion of advisory electoral commissions
in other countries that take on tasks such as recommending election
administration and redistricting reform. He explains:
There is some basis for thinking that independent commissions can
develop persuasive authority with the citizenry, i.e., the capacity to shift
aggregate public opinion in the direction of the commission’s preferred
policy, on questions about electoral reform and legislative ethics. True,
across most public policy domains most of the time, there’s little reason to
think that voters would or should have greater faith in an independent
actor than in their elected representatives. But in the election law context,
where voters, like law professors, may suspect their representatives of
improperly elevating partisan advantage or personal security-in-office
above the overall health of the political process, voters may well develop a
presumptive preference for policymaking by a politically insulated body.
Moreover, a lawmaker’s vote against accountability-oriented reforms
proposed by an independent commission may be interpreted by her
constituents as evidence of venality, a label politicians are desperate to
avoid. That interpretation may make the lawmaker’s vote politically
consequential even if electoral reform as such is not a high-priority issue
for her constituents.77
Elmendorf points to some anecdotal evidence from the U.K. and
elsewhere suggesting that advisory election commissions may use this kind of
“bully pulpit” to shame legislators into election reform out of fear of incurring the
wrath of an angry public,78 though he notes there are not yet any systematic
empirical studies to prove it.

77

Elmendorf, supra note 11, at 431-32 (footnotes omitted). Elmendorf’s proposal allows the
advisory commission to mandate the right to trigger a close-rule vote in the legislature on
proposed legislation. See id.
78
Id. See also Elmendorf, Advisory Commission, supra note 11, at 1447 (advisory electoral
commissions “could enhance political competition by putting disentrenching reforms on the
lawmaking agenda—and by raising the ballot-box tariff for incumbents who vote against those
reforms.”). Elmendorf also points to some empirical evidence of the importance voters attach to
their perception that a candidate will serve the public interest in good faith. Id. at 1421-23.
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Foley and Elmendorf, like Gerken, posit that both rational and emotional
forces can be leveraged through information from credible sources to achieve
better election administration rules. The provision of additional, neutral
information combined with the forces of shame, pride, and competition, hold out
the promise of getting “from here to there.” The remainder of this Review
considers the likelihood that Gerken’s Index can achieve what it promises.

A.

III.
THE DEMOCRACY INDEX AND THE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION WARS
Will It Work? The Democracy Index and Increased Professionalism

There is a certain irony to Gerken’s book: in arguing for more data to spur
election administration reform, Gerken must rely primarily on anecdotes, not hard
data, to show that increased information about election administration practices
and the accompanying rankings will spur election reform. Thus, Gerken posits
that the Democracy Index will spark states such as New York and Pennsylvania to
ask questions like “What Would Jersey Do?”79 when it comes to election
administration reform.
But how do we know what will happen? Pennsylvania has had its share of
election administration problems.80 Would the rational and emotional causal
mechanisms posited by Gerken actually lead a state like Pennsylvania to fix its
system of election administration if it ranked lower than New Jersey on the
Democracy Index, much like the EPI spurred Belgium and Korea to fix their low
environmental ratings?
Without actually putting the Democracy Index into effect, there is no way
to know for sure whether it will work. Gerken (and the other New
Institutionalists) cannot be faulted for relying primarily upon anecdote in the
absence of better empirical data,81 and, as Gerken argues repeatedly throughout
the book, we need to consider the “compared to what” question: it is not clear
what strategies could be put into place besides the Democracy Index to spur
election reform (though I offer a few in my Conclusion).
Lacking hard data, in this Part I offer my own seat-of-the-pants
empiricism on whether the Index, if created, is likely to improve U.S. election
administration. My hypothesis is that the Index is likely to lead to improvements
to the extent it measures things which are (1) easily susceptible to measurement
79

GERKEN, supra note †, at 88.
See the work of the voter organization VotePa, as chronicled on the website
http://www.votepa.us/.
81
Gerken does rely upon data about mimicry and norm diffusion, see GERKEN, supra note †, at
87, but for reasons I give in the next Part, it is not clear that these general trends would apply in
the election administration field.
80
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and (2) not subject to much ideological disagreement. On these matters, relative
rankings could well work like the EPI in providing relevant information to
rational decisionmakers and to elicit emotions of shame, pride, and competition to
spur professionalization and the allocation of additional resources to election
administration reform. However, much of election administration is so politicized
that the Index, or the Index alone, is unlikely to bring us to Gerken’s ideal.
Moreover, the forces of localism are sure to reject reliance on an Index that can
lead to the emergence of national standards that would weaken local power and
control.
I begin with an example showing how the Index could work to improve
performance and professionalism in the case of easily measured, relatively nonideological measures of election administration performance. Consider the
residual vote rate, which measures the difference between the number of voters
recorded as showing up at the polls and the number of voters who cast a vote for
president.82 Some of the residual vote rate is attributable to a voluntary choice of
voters not to cast a vote for the top of the ticket (undervoting). But it also is
partially attributable with problems with how voters tried to cast votes that either
were not correctly recorded on the ballot, or not correctly counted on the voting
machine. Though there is some reason to think that the rate of deliberate
undervoting could differ somewhat by race or other categories,83 the choice
should be indifferent depending upon the type of machinery used,84 especially if
one controls for socioeconomic factors.
The residual vote rate, then, can be used as a diagnostic tool to ferret out
problems with election administration, especially vote counting and casting
technology. Consider the controversial California gubernatorial recall in 2003.
The recall ballot contained only four questions: should the sitting governor be
recalled (yes or no)?, if he is recalled, who should replace him?, and yes or no
votes on two unrelated ballot measures.
According to Henry Brady’s
calculations,85 the residual vote rate for the top of the ballot, the first question on
the recall, was more than 5 percent of voters in counties using unreliable punch
card technology, with Los Angeles (then a punch card jurisdiction) coming in just
below 9 percent of the ballots. It defies reason that one in eleven Los Angeles
voters would turn out to vote in the recall election, and then deliberately not
82

Charles Stewart III, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 158 (2006).
Michael Tomz & Robert Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in
Voided Ballots?,” 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 46 (2003).
84
Some have suggested that voters using electronic voting machines feel pressured not to
undervote by the machines’ “review page” allowing voters to confirm their choices, but I have
seen no academic studies of this phenomenon.
85
Henry E. Brady, Postponing the California Recall to Protect Voting Rights, 37 PS: POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND POLITICS 27 (2004).
83
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decide to vote for or against the recall. The 9 percent figure is especially
disconcerting in light of the 0.74 percent residual vote rate in Alameda County, a
jurisdiction somewhat similar in demography to Los Angeles but one that used
electronic voting machines.86
The residual vote rate is relatively easy to measure (it requires knowing
only two numbers: the number of voters reported showing up at the polls, and the
total number of votes cast for all candidates at the top of the ticket87) and its use
as a measure of election administration effectiveness is not open to much
question. That is, there is no sound ideological argument for high residual vote
rates.
The Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project focused its attention on
residual vote rates in the aftermath of the 2000 Florida debacle,88 and we have
seen marked improvement in residual vote rates nationally since 2000.89 Once the
project began measuring the residual vote rate, Congress devoted funds in HAVA
to replacing unreliable voting machines, as a major factor in high residual vote
rates.
Public attention on residual vote rates continues, with the New York
Times recently calling attention to a report from the Florida Department of State90
comparing the residual vote rates in Florida in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008.91
In 2000, when Florida counties used many different kinds of voting machines,
including unreliable punch card machines, the residual vote rate was 2.9%. In
2004 the number plummeted to 0.41 percent, when Florida shifted mostly to
electronic voting machines. In 2008, Florida abandoned those machines given
public concern about their security, shifting in many counties to the use of
optically scanned ballots. The residual vote rate then rose to 0.75 percent.92 The
shift was unsurprising, given that electronic voting machines are very good at
preventing voters from inadvertently overvoting for more than one candidate for a

86

Id.; see also Richard L. Hasen, The California Recall Punch Card Litigation: Why Bush v. Gore
Does Not “Suck,” in CLICKER POLITICS: EASSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA RECALL 170, 178 (Shaun
Bowler & Bruce E. Cain, eds., 2006).
87
Perhaps surprisingly, these numbers are not always generally available. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
88
See Residual Votes, Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project (collecting project’s research on
the topic), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/taxonomy/term/43.
89
Ansolabehere, supra note 30; Stewart, supra note 82.
90
Florida Department of State, Analysis and Reporting of Overvotes and Undervotes for the 2008
General
Election,
Jan.
30,
2009,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/Over_Under_Report_08.pdf.
91
Gary Fineout, Invalid Ballots in Florida Doubled in 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/us/26florida.html.
92
Id.
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race.93 Interestingly, when it comes to shaming, the Times headline negatively
characterized Florida’s 2008 residual rate as “doubling” since 2004.94 However,
many experts in the field believe that a residual vote rate under 1 percent is a
good election administration practice.95 Florida’s choice to abandon electronic
voting machines which the public had come to doubt in exchange for a higher but
still very low residual vote rate seemed like a reasonable choice for the state to
make.
In any event, the experience with changes since 2000 in the residual vote
rate demonstrates that when the right factors come together—easily measurable
data, money, and ideological agreement on the direction of change—election
administration reform is possible. To the extent that the Index can find other
things to measure comparable to the residual vote rate, the Index can succeed in
improving election administration. As best practices develop and money is
targeted to solve problems about which there is ideological agreement and which
are solvable with better data and more money, I expect professionalization of
election administration to increase.96
Unfortunately, as demonstrated below, few other election administration
rubrics will be as non-ideological and as susceptible to easy measure as the
residual vote rate. If Pennsylvania can credibly claim that the Index is biased, or
that New Jersey values the wrong things in its election administration process,
Pennsylvania’s attitude may be less “WWJD?” and more that of Rosanne
Rosannadana.97
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. (quoting Professor Douglas W. Jones as stating that a residual vote rate below 1 percent was
on the “good side”); Cf. GERKEN, supra note †, at 90 (“a professional norm might deem that
voting machines should not produce a residual vote rate higher than 1 percent”).
96
Even in the face of problems, however, states are not always embarrassed into election
administration reform. See Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 6, at 18 (“For example, given that
there were over twenty lawsuits brought challenging one or another aspect of California recall law
in 2003, the California legislature has done nothing to fix the obvious contradictions and problems
with the California Elections Code. My favorite example is the internal code contradiction on the
rules for nominating someone to be a replacement candidate in the event voters choose to recall a
sitting governor. The recall rules state that the “usual nomination rules shall apply” to recall
elections. And the first of the “usual nomination rules” provides that the rules do not apply to
recall elections. The California Secretary of State then applied the rules (which normally apply to
primary elections) requiring that candidates wishing to run for governor in the recall provide only
65 signatures and $3,000, leading to the unwieldy 2003 election and ballot featuring 135
candidates for governor, including the child actor Gary Coleman, a porn star, and a watermelonsmashing Gallagher.”).
97
Rosannadana was a Saturday Night Live character created by Gilda Radner who made
consistently
disparaging
remarks
about
New
Jersey.
See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roseanne_Roseannadanna.
94
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The Problems of Partisanship

Despite Gerken’s noble intentions, I have little doubt that the Democracy
Index, at least as currently framed, would be painted as a partisan effort to help
Democrats in the election administration wars. The Index faces this danger not
because Gerken worked for President Obama’s election, a fact she notes in the
book’s Afterword.98 It is that the concerns she expresses about American election
administration that are embodied in the Index will resonate more with Democrats
than Republicans.
Recall that Gerken writes that the Index
should assess how close a jurisdiction comes to reaching these goals:
Every eligible voter who wants to register can do so.
Every registered voter who wants to cast a ballot can do so.
Every ballot cast is counted properly.99
These factors put Gerken on the “access” side of the “access” versus
“integrity” debate. A Republican would like ask: where is the concern about
potential voter fraud? Where are the measures of voter registration fraud? Why
not list as one of the core Index principles the idea that “No ineligible voters may
register to vote or cast a ballot?”
ACORN gets no mention in the book, not even in the book’s Afterword
reflecting on the 2008 election, despite the fact that for Republicans, voter
registration fraud committed by ACORN employees was the election
administration story of 2008. The Republican demonization of ACORN was such
a part of the 2008 campaign that it made it into one of the presidential debates,
when Senator McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, hyperbolically
accused the group of being “on the verge of maybe perpetrating one of the

There are other reasons to believe the analogy between the Democracy Index and the EPI
are inapt. First, in many democracies there are large, affluent groups of citizens agitating for
environmental regulation on a scale much larger than election administration reform movements
in the United States. Second, countries may retaliate against other countries with low EPI scores,
such as by not cooperating on trade or other issues. No such outside dynamic would occur
between states with low scores on the Democracy Index.
98
GERKEN, supra note †, at 139-42.
99
Id. at 29; see also id. at 123.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392299

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

21

greatest frauds in voter history in this country, maybe destroying the fabric of
democracy.”100
This is not to say that Gerken’s Index would not consider rubrics such as
the amount voter registration fraud (though to the extent such fraud is outside the
control of election administrators, perhaps not101). As noted above,102 Gerken
does suggest some “fraud” measures generally, though it is difficult to know what
they would be and how “fraud” would be measured. But preventing registration
fraud does not figure at all prominently in Gerken’s book.
More importantly, the book does not acknowledge that a cumulative
ranking of election administration in the states will have to come up with some
way of measuring the trade-off between access versus integrity. Consider, for
example, a statistic showing that one state turns away more voters because they
lack identification at the polls than another state does. Should this factor be used
in the Index to give the state turning voters away lacking identification a lower
score, on grounds that not every eligible voter who wishes to cast a valid ballot
should do so, or should it be used to give the state turning away voters lacking
identification a higher score, on grounds that the state has done more than others
to deter voter fraud?103 A single index score cannot do both.
Perhaps then it is no surprise that no Republicans agreed to cosponsor
either then-Senator Obama’s bill putting the Democracy Index into federal law,104
or then-Senator Clinton’s bill which, among other things, would have required a
100

Jess
Henig,
ACORN
Accusations,
FACTCHECK.ORG,
Oct.
18,
2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/164722. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and
Institutional Reform: Lessons from a Historic Election, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE, Jan.
22, 2009, http://www.hlpronline.com/Tokaji_HLPR_012209.pdf (recounting the disputes over
ACORN and third party voter registration)
101
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
102
See supra note 46.
103
I am not arguing that voter identification laws in fact deter voter fraud. Indeed, I believe that
such laws do little, if anything, to prevent such fraud. But the point is that this is a contested
political position, one that will not be subject to technocratic resolution by the crafters of the
Democracy Index. Even if one took the position that such laws do little to deter fraud, an Index
that discounted the value of voter identification for this reason would be seen as weighing in on
one side of this debate.
It might be valuable to construct an index measuring only questions of voter access, but that
measure is unlikely to serve the bipartisan shaming functions that Gerken depends upon in her
argument.
104
S. 737, 110th Cong., 2d Sess, Voter Access and Democracy Index Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-737 (co-sponsored by Sen. Feingold).
Similarly, Obama’s Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2007, S, 453,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-453, had 21 co-sponsors in the Senate, all
Democrats,
and
60
co-sponsors
in
the
House,
H.R.
1281,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1281, all Democrats.
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study of the feasibility of the Democracy Index.105 Consider also the accessoriented (and not integrity-oriented) data that would be collected under the 2007
Obama bill:
Voter Data Described- The voter data described in this subsection includes
any data the Office determines appropriate for developing or refining the
Democracy Index published under subsection (b), which may include the
following:
(1) The amount of time spent by voters waiting in line.
(2) The number of voters who appeared at, or were incorrectly
directed to, the wrong polling place.
(3) The rate of voter ballots discarded or not counted, and the
reasons those voter ballots were discarded or not counted.
(4) Provisional voting rates, including the percentage of
provisional ballots that were cast and not counted and the reasons
those provisional ballots were not counted.
(5) The number and a description of registration and election day
complaints, including any problems faced by individual voters in
becoming involved and effectively participating in the process and
the reasons given for such problems.
(6) The rate of voting system malfunctions and the time required
on average to put malfunctioning voting systems back online or
otherwise correct the malfunction, or to replace them.106
Though Gerken notes that “John McCain [has] long been interested in
election reform,”107 there is no indication that the Democracy Index has sparked
any interest on Senator McCain’s part or elsewhere on the Republican side of the
aisle, or that it will be viewed as anything but a Democratic plan concerned
primarily with voter access. When it comes to election reform, Republicans have
105

S. 804, 110th Cong, 2d. Sess., Count Every Vote Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-804 (co-sponsored by seven Democratic
Senators).
The
House
version
of
the
Clinton
bill,
H.R.
1381,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1381, was sponsored by a Democratic
Representative and co-sponsored by 21 Democrats. No Republicans co-sponsored the proposed
legislation.
106
S. 737, 110th Cong., 2d Sess, Voter Access and Democracy Index Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-737, sec. 223(c).
107
GERKEN, supra note †, at 119.
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cared primarily about questions of voter fraud,108 and any ranking that does not
place that front-and-center is likely not to be accepted on that side of the aisle. To
the extent Republicans discuss access, it is typically around the issue of
improving election administration for overseas military voters, a question that
does not get prominence in Gerken’s book.109
As I have chronicled elsewhere,110 partisan wars over voter identification
have spilled into state legislatures, with Democrats supporting legislation such as
election day voter registration easing voter access, with Republicans favoring
voter identification laws on grounds of election integrity. Republicans sometimes
view such Democratic efforts as easing the way for ineligible voters to vote, or
allowing eligible voters to cast more than one ballot. Democrats, in contrast, see
voter identification laws as a means of suppressing the votes of likely Democratic
voters. The situation was perhaps the ugliest in Texas, where last year Democrats
had to wheel in a Democratic Senator recovering from a liver transplant in a
hospital bed to vote to filibuster a Republican-favored voter identification law in
the Texas Senate.111 This year Republicans pushed through a special rule
exempting voter identification bills from the possibility of a filibuster, and the bill
passed the Texas Senate on a party line vote.112
Consider as well the partisan recriminations over the state of election
administration in Minnesota in light of the 2008 Senate contest between
Republican Norm Coleman and Democrat Al Franken. Minnesota has a
reputation for sound and fair non-partisan election administration, at least
compared to its surrounding neighbors.113 Yet with a razor-thin race, every
problem with election administration was seen through a partisan lens, as when
Michael Stokes Paulson attributed the decisions to count or not count certain
ballots in the recount to partisan mischief,114 and the Wall Street Journal

108

See, e.g., JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY (rev’d ed. 2008).
109
I have no reason to doubt that Gerken favors improving election administration issues for
overseas military voters. But the fact that she chooses not to highlight the issue will serve as a
signal to Republicans over the valence of the measure.
110
Hasen, supra note 6; Hasen, supra note 18.
111
Mark Lisheron, Ill Senator Settles in For Voter ID Fight, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May
22,
2007,
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editorialized that the recount process was “being overseen by Democratic
Secretary of State Mark Ritchie, who isn't exactly a nonpartisan observer.”115
In this intense partisan atmosphere, it is hard to imagine the creation of an
overall Index that could transcend the election administration wars. The few
attempts at bipartisanship have mostly failed, including HAVA and the CarterBaker commission, which many Democrats, including Gerken, characterized as
making poor decisions in the face of not enough data.
Intense partisanship means that if the Index is actually promulgated
campaigns for secretaries of state will not coalesce around the rankings. If
Republicans can paint the ranking as a slanted Democratic Party ranking, it will
be lost in the partisan noise. In any case, party label is likely to be more
important than Index score in influencing how voters vote in a low salience
Secretary of State race. Indeed, Democrats in recent years have been raising
money for secretary of state races on the promise of having Democrats in the
offices to protect against partisan administration by Republicans.116 And while
Democrats have portrayed Jennifer Brunner, the Democrat who replaced the
controversial Ken Blackwell as Ohio’s Secretary of State, as a fair and
nonpartisan reformer, Republicans believe she has tilted election administration in
favor of Democrats’ interests, going so far as the U.S. Supreme Court in an
attempt to overturn Brunner’s decision not to allow local Ohio election
jurisdictions to use a HAVA-mandated list of “mismatches” between voter
registration databases and motor vehicle department records as a basis to exclude
voters from the polls.117
In short, the partisan nature of election administration in this country
makes the analogy to the EPI a strained one. No credible foreign leaders will
speak out against a clean environment or the EPI. There may be differences
across countries over how to achieve reductions in pollutants in the air and sea,
for example, but there is widespread agreement that reducing pollutants is a good
thing. There is much less consensus within the United States—beyond lower
residual vote rates—over what makes up a good system of election
115

Editorial,
Mischief
in
Minnesota,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
12,
2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122644940271419147.html.
116
Avi Zenilman, Secretaries of State Gives Dem Firewall, POLITICO, Nov. 2, 2008,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/15105.html (recounting actions of “Secretary of State
Project”).
117
The case over the Ohio Secretary of State’s refusal to produce a list of mismatches between
state voter registration databases and the statewide motor vehicle database went all the way to the
United States Supreme Court a few days before election day. The Court held that the Ohio
Republican Party could not sue the secretary for her alleged failure to follow a provision of the
Help America Vote Act regarding database mismatches because the party was unlikely to be able
to prove that the statute created a private right of action. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 129
S.Ct. 5 (2008).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392299

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

25

administration.118 The partisan debate needs to cool down before the Index will
be able to have a major effect on election administration in this country.
C.

The Resistance of State and Local Election Officials
As if the likely partisan resistance to the use of the rankings is not enough
of an impediment to the Democracy Index working its magic, Gerken may
underestimate the power of local and state interests to block the emergence of any
uniform standards (even “best practices”) promulgated by Congress.
Gerken acknowledges the power of localism. She quotes former EAC
commissioner Ray Martinez discussing the “pushback” he encountered whenever
the EAC raised the possibility of crafting best practices.119 Moreover, she notes
that the National Association of Secretaries of State, a bipartisan group of state
chief election officers, “demanded that Congress dismantle [the EAC] even before
all of its members had been appointed.”120
The history of election administration in this country is hyperdecentralization.121 Much of the power for administering elections rests in the
sub-state level, at the county level or lower. Local election officials mistrust state
officials, and both local and state officials do not want the federal government
interfering with state traditional prerogatives in administering elections.
So far as I know, no political scientists have yet studied the power of the
lobby of local and state election administrators, including the National
Association of Secretaries of State, the National Association of State Election
Directors, and the Election Center, to block federal election reform that impinges
on state and local control. Anecdotal evidence (again, the best we have) suggests
the forces are considerable. Witness how Congress in enacting HAVA did not
grant the EAC any power to issue rules or regulations binding on state or local
118
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governments.122 The common wisdom about election administration reform in
the current congressional environment is that anything that increases a federal
role over state and local election administrators is a non-starter because of the
power of these groups.
The Democracy Index, of course, does not impose standards on state and
local officials. But given that local election administrators have fought the
promulgation of “best practices,” they are likely to fight the Index as well.
Moreover, to the extent that the legislation creating the Index mandates nothing
but data collection, it is not clear that forces of shame or pride will overcome
local resistance to uniformity and centralized control.
CONCLUSION
Gerken’s engaging book asks all the right questions, and creatively
considers how to move from “here to there” in election administration reform. It
is a breath of fresh air from earlier juricentric thinking about reform. To the
extent that data collection can lead to rankings based upon objective measures
subject to ideological agreement, the Index is likely to increase the
professionalization of election administration in the United States and thereby
decrease the chances of electoral meltdown.
As Part III shows, however, the Index has its limitations as well. Some
measures of election administration are not as easily measurable as a residual vote
rate, and some measures have an ideological dimension. The measures that
Gerken proposes are ones that fall on the Democratic Party/access side of the
access versus integrity debate. I am very sympathetic with the values embodied
in Gerken’s index, but the political reality is that the Index will be viewed through
partisan lenses, and the Index, unless it moved more toward incorporating
“integrity” values is not likely to gain universal acceptance as a technocratic nonideological improvement in this partisan era. Moreover, the lobbying forces of
state and local election administrators appear considerable, and at this point they
appear resistant even to soft attempts to cajole them into developing a set of best
practices.
Gerken rightly asks the “compared to what” question. It is easier to knock
down Gerken’s proposed “here-to-there” strategy than to propose something else
which might work better. Here, briefly, are two suggestions.
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First, election reformers should lobby state legislatures and Congress in
cases of unified party control of the executive and legislative branches to pass
election administration reform packages. The experience after 2000 shows that
the best predictor of election administration reform is unified party control.123
Reformers should press Democrats in Congress now to pass an election reform
package, even over Republican objections, which directly imposes certain best
practices on state and local government, such as maximum residual vote rates and
maximum poll wait times. Registration reform in light of both registration
problems and registration fraud should be fixed. Overseas voting, by military
voters and others should be improved greatly. This is an “old” institutionalist
answer, but one that does not depend upon courts: have legislative leaders use
typical hardball politics to push reform through a legislative body. The open
question is whether Democrats will propose important Republican-favored
election reforms, such as making it easier for overseas military voters to vote,
even if Democrats do not expect to benefit from them.
Second, wealthy individuals interested in election administration reform
should back nonpartisan election administration initiatives in those states with the
initiative process.
For example, California should consider an initiated
constitutional amendment removing the power to administer elections from the
partisan-elected Secretary of State, and place that power into the hands of a
nonpartisan appointed election official, nominated by the governor and subject to
a 75% approval of the state legislature. Anyone who can get 75% approval of the
state legislature is likely to be considered fair by both Democrats and
Republicans.124 This is also “old” institutionalist in that it uses the initiative
process to bypass a state legislature that likely would not tackle election
administration reform by itself.
There is no harm is trying to use the Democracy Index to encourage and
cajole improvements in election administration. If such an Index can be created it
no doubt would improve the professionalization of election administration in this
country. The collection of data alone would be a great leap forward in our
understanding of elections and election problems. But it may take much more
than an Index to move us from here to there.
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